Paul Wallbank – Brilliant Communications

Tag: silicon valley

Bubble values
The argument continues about Facebook’s purchase of photo sharing site Instagram.

One side claims a billion dollars for a business with barely any revenue and 13 employees is clear evidence of a bubble while the other side say its a strategic purchase that is only 1% of Facebook’s estimated $100 billion market value.

The latter argument is deeply flawed, comparing the purchase price against the value of other assets is always risky – particularly in a market where those underlying assets are being valued at the same inflated rates.

We could think of it in terms of a Dutch farmer in early 1637 claiming that paying a thousand Florins for a tulip is fine when he has a warehouse containing hundreds of them.

In reality, that farmer during the Dutch Tulip mania of the 17th Century held contracts for delivery; just as modern day investors held Collateral Debt Obligations.

Measuring value against other inflated assets is always dangerous and only fuels a bubble.

A much more concerning way of judging the wisdom of Facebook’s investment is against profit and revenue.

If we compare the purchase of Instagram against Facebook’s revenue, then the investment has cost them three months income.

Should we compare the acquisition against profit, Instagram has cost Facebook five years of profit at current rates.

Both of those numbers are very high and it indicates how big a gamble the Instagram acquisition is for Facebook.

It can be argued there is a lot of blue sky ahead for Facebook and that future profits and revenues will justify the Instagram purchase.

There’s also a very compelling argument that Facebook has to get into mobile services and Instagram does that.

Whether Instagram is worth three months income or five years profit to Facebook remains to be seen, but we should have no doubt it indicates we are well into Tech Boom 2.0.

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May 1, 2012
Bubble economics
You know you’re in an investment bubble when the pundits declare “we’re not in a bubble”.

A good example of this is Andy Baio’s defence of Facebook’s billion dollar purchase of Instagram.

Justifying the price, Andy compares the Facebook purchase with a number of notorious Silicon Valley buyouts using two metrics; cost per employee and cost per user.

Which proves the old saw of “lies, damn lies and statistics”.

The use of esoteric and barely relevant statistics is one of the characteristics of a bubble; all of a sudden the old metrics don’t apply and, because of the never ending blue sky ahead, valuations can only go up.

Andy’s statistics are good example of this and ignore the three things that really matter when a business is bought.

Current earnings

The simplest test of a business’ viability is how much money is it making? For the vast majority of businesses bought and sold in the world economy, this is the measure.

Whether you’re buying a local newsagency outright or shares in a multinational manufacturer, this is the simplest and most effective measure of a sensible investment.

Future earnings

More complex, but more important, are the prospects of future earnings. That local newsagency or multinational manufacturer might look like a good investment on today’s figures, but it may be in a declining market.

Similarly a business incurring losses at the moment may be profitable under better management. This was the basis of the buyout boom of the 1980s and much of the 1990s.

Most profitable of all is buying into a high growth business, if you can find the next Google or Apple you can retire to the coast. The hope of finding these is what drives much of the current venture capital gold rush.

Strategic reasons

For corporations, there may be good strategic reasons for buying out a business that on paper doesn’t appear to be a good investment.

There’s a whole host of reasons why an organisation would do that, one variation of the Silicon Valley business model is to buy in talented developers who are running their own startups. Google and Facebook have made many acquisitions of small software development companies for that reason.

Fear Of Missing Out

In the Silicon Valley model, the biggest strategic reason for paying over the odds for a business is FOMO – Fear Of Missing Out.

To be fair to the valley, this is true in any bubble – whether it’s for Dutch tulips in the 17th Century or Florida property in the 20th. If you don’t buy now, you’ll miss out on big profits.

When we look at Andy Baio’s charts in Wired, this is what leaps out. Most of the purchases were driven by managements’ fear they were going to miss The Next Big Thing.

The most notorious of all in Andy’s chart is News Corp’s 580 million dollar purchase of MySpace, although there were good strategic reasons for the transaction which Rupert Murdoch’s management team were unable to realise.

eBay’s $2.6 billion acquisition of Skype is probably the best example of Fear Of Missing Out, particularly given they sold it back to the original founders who promptly flicked it to Microsoft. eBay redeems itself though with the strategic purchase of PayPal.

Probably the worst track record goes to Yahoo! who have six of the thirty purchases listed on Andy’s list and not one of them has delivered for Yahoo!’s long suffering shareholders.

The term “greater fools” probably doesn’t come close to describe Yahoo!’s management over the last decade or so.

While Andy Baio’s article seeks to disprove the idea of a Silicon Valley bubble, what he shows is the bubble is alive, big and growing.

One of the exciting things about bubbles is they have a habit of growing bigger than most rational outsiders expect before they burst spectacularly.

We live in exciting times.

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April 11, 2012
Hyping start ups for pleasure and profit
Monday’s announcement that Facebook would buy photo sharing website Instagram shows the power of Silicon Valley investor networks and how they operate, we should be careful about trying to emulate that model too closely.

Intagram has been operating for 18 months, has 13 employees, has no prospects of making a profit and is worth a billion dollars to the social media giant. Pretty impressive.

A look at the employees and investors in Instagram shows the pedigree of the founders and their connections; all the regular Silicon Valley names appear – people connected with Google, Sequoia Capital, Twitter, Andreessen Horowitz.

The network is the key to the sale, just as groups of entrepreneurs, investors, workers and innovators came together to build manufacturing hubs like the English Midlands in the 18th Century, the US midwest in the 19th Century and the Pearl River Delta at the end of the 20th Century, so too have they come together in Silicon Valley for the internet economy.

It’s tempting for governments to try to ape the perceived successes of Silicon Valley through subsidies and industry support programs but real success is to build networks around the strengths of the local economy, this is what drove those manufacturing hubs and today’s successful technology centres.

What’s dangerous in the current dot com mania in Silicon Valley is the rest of the world is learning the wrong lessons; we’re glamourising a specific, narrow business model that’s built around a small group of insiders.

The Greater Fool business model is only applicable to a tiny sub set of well connected entrepreneurs in a very narrow ecosystem.

For most businesses the Greater Fool business model isn’t valid.

Even in Silicon Valley the great, successful business like Apple, Google and Facebook – and those not in Silicon Valley like Microsoft and Amazon – built real revenues and profits and didn’t grow by selling out to the dominant corporations of the day.

The Instagrams and other high profile startup buy outs are the exception, not the rule.

If we define “success” by finding someone willing to spend shareholders’ equity on a business without profits then these businesses are insanely successful.

Should we define business success by creating profits, jobs or shareholder value then the Silicon Valley VC model isn’t the one we want to follow.

We need to also keep in mind that Silicon Valley is a historical accident that owes as much to government spending on military technology as it does to entrepreneurs and well connected venture capital funds.

It’s unlikely any country – even the United States – could today replicate the Cold War defense spending that drove Silicon Valley’s development and much of California’s post World War II growth.

One thing the United States government has done is pump the world economy full of money to avoid a global depression after the crisis of 2008.

Some of that money has bubbled up in Silicon Valley and that’s where the money comes to buy companies like Instagram.

Rather than try to replicate the historical good fortune of others, we need to make our own luck by building the structures that work for our strengths and advantages.

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April 10, 2012
Insanely profitable
Apple’s announcement that they will start paying dividends to shareholders changes a number of things in Apple’s business model and those of many other businesses.

The sheer size of Apple’s cash reserves also illustrate how profitable the outsourced manufacturing model is as well the contradictary nature of special pleading by affluent corporations.

Moving a cash mountain

Not only is Apple’s business insanely profitable, but sales are growing exponentially. In the company’s conference call, CEO Tim Cook reported that 37 million iPhones sold last quarter and 55 million iPads sold in the last two years.

Apple’s CFO Peter Oppenheimer pointed out the company’s cash reserves increased $31 billion in 2011 and 2012 is on track for a similar result in 2012, leaving them plenty of money for investment along with a “warchest for strategic opportunities”.

Paying a dividend

The reluctance to pay dividends has been a feature of the US corporate for the last few decades and Apple are certainly not alone in not distributing their profits to shareholders.

Companies like Microsoft, Google and Oracle -even Yahoo! once upon a time – have been just as profitable as Apple and their efforts to shrink their cash mountains has had some perverse effect.

Many of these companies have squandered suprpluses on poorly thoughtout and badly executed buyouts of smaller businesses, this urge to avoid returning money to owner has been one of the drivers of the Silicon Valley VC Greater Fool model.

Another result of fat profits is the rise of flabby, overstaffed management ranks at some of these companies. Although this certainly isn’t the case at Apple where Steve Jobs ran a very lean machine.

The retail model

Unlike their major tech competitors Apple is a manufacturing and retail business as well. In 2012, 40 new stores are planned around the world.

This vertical control of their markets, from the beginings of the supply chain to “owning” the end customer is anathema to modern MBA thinking and probably the area that gives them the greatest competitive advantage over their hardware competitors.

Justifying Mike Daisy

In some ways this announcement justfies Mike Dasy’s discredited criticisms about Apple’s Chinese suppliers.

The reason for manufacturing these goods in places like China, India or Vietnam is the vastly cheaper cost of doing business, not just in labour rates but in reduced environmental and safety standards.

Plenty of brand name clothing, footware and fashion accessory companies make similar massive profits to Apple with their ten, twenty and sometimes hundred fold markups on their products.

Repatriating profits

One of the big changes of Apple repatriating money is that is undercuts the special pleading by these extremely profitable companies that they should have a US tax holiday so they can repatriate their riches.

It’s now clear these companies can easily afford to pay the taxes of their home countries and it’s time they started to, along with returning dividends to their shareholders.

Once again Apple have changed the way others do business, how these changes affect the way we invest and governments treat companies is going to be one of the most interesting developments over the next decade.

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March 20, 2012
Why governments fail in building Silicon Valleys
Don’t Give the Arnon Kohavis Your Money warns Sarah Lacy in her cautionary tale of what happens when an economic messiah comes to town promising to create the next Silicon Valley.

“Hopefully this story finds a way to circulate out to the wider audience of government officials and old money elites who have good intentions of wanting to make their city a beacon for entrepreneurship.” Writes Sarah. “Hopefully it reaches them before they get bamboozled into giving the wrong people money to make it happen.”

Bamboozled Bureaucrats

For 19 months I was one of those government officials and saw those good intentions up close while developing what became the Digital Sydney project, that bamboozlement is real and a lot of money does go to the wrong people.

Sarah’s points are well made, Silicon Valley wasn’t built quickly with its roots based in the 1930s electronic industry and the 1960s developments in semiconductors – all underpinned by massive US defence spending from World War II onwards.

In many ways Silicon Valley was a happy and prosperous accident where various economic, political and technological forces came together without any planning. Neither the Californian or US Governments decreed they would make the region an entrepreneurial hotbed and sent out legions of public servants armed with subsidies and incentives to build a global business centre.

This is the mistake governments – and a lot of entrepreneurs or business leaders – make when they talk about “building the next Silicon Valley”; they assume that tax free zones, incentive schemes and subsidies are going to attract the investors and inventors necessary to build the next entrepreneurial hotspot.

For governments, the results are discouraging; usually ending in failed incubators and accelerator programs all conceived by public servants who, with the best will in the world, don’t have the skills, incentives or decades long timelines to make these schemes work.

New England’s failure

At worst, we end up with the corporate welfare model that sees governments and communities exploited like the tragic story of New London, Connecticut, where the local government spent $160 million and cleared an entire suburb for drug company Pfizer to establish their research headquarters, which they closed a few years later and left a waste dump behind.

While the New London story is one of the worst examples, this sort of corporate welfare is the standard role for most government economic agencies. The department I worked for gave subsidies to supermarket chains to open distribution centres and stores that they were going to build anyway.

One of the notable things with development agencies and the provincial politicians who oversee them is how they are easy victims for the economic messiah – it could be a pharmaceutical giant like in New London, a property developer promising Sydney will become a financial hub or a US venture capital guru flying in and promising Santiago will be the next San Francisco.

The truth is there are no short cuts; building a technology centre like Silicon Valley, a financial hub like London or a manufacturing cluster like Italy’s Leather Triangle take decades, some luck and little intervention by government agencies or outside messiahs.

Silicon Valley and most other successful industry centres are the result of a happy intersection of economics and history. The best governments can do is create the stable financial, tax and legal frameworks that let inventors, innovators and entrepreneurs build new industries.

All government support isn’t bad as well thought out, long term programs that help new businesses and technologies grow being the very effective – we should keep in mind though taht Silicon Valley couldn’t have happened without massive US military and space program spending.

Like a parent with a baby, the best governments can do is create the right environment and hope for the best. Interfering rarely works well.

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December 27, 2011