Category: Australia

  • Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Five: A productive and resilient Australian economy

    Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Five: A productive and resilient Australian economy

    This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report.

    Chapter five of Australia in the Asian Century looks at the domestic settings the nation needs to achieve the “2025 apirations” described in Chapter Four.

    To do this lays out a number of national objectives to achieve Australia’s 2025 Aspirations which are at least ambitious. These include education, innovation, infrastructure, communications and tax.

    Education

    National objective 1: All Australians will have the opportunity to acquire the skills and education they need to participate fully in a strong economy and a fairer society.

    Probably the most worthy of the report’s objectives is to improve the nation’s already good level of education. Unfortunately the detail in the report is lacking beyond rehashing existing programs.

    These programs do cover important initiatives such as improving literacy rates amongst the disadvantaged which is essential if Australia is going to address its poor participation rates which are going to be one of the major domestic challenges for the country in the 21st Century.

    At the other end of education though there is little more than empty words as the discussion of workforce training is rendered hollow by the decision to further cut back apprenticeship training and universities find their funding continually reduced making it less likely they can get into the world’s top rankings.

    Most importantly, there is little space given to addressing Australia’s poor performance in the STEM – Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics – subjects.

    Innovation

    National objective 2: Australia will have an innovation system, in the top 10 globally, that supports excellence and dynamism in business with a creative problem-solving culture that enhances our evolving areas of strength and attracts top researchers, companies and global partnerships.

    More fine words but this commitment to ‘innovation’ is again hollow when the Federal government cuts commercialisation incentives and export program.

    Any talk of encouraging innovation is pointless anyway without reforming the nation’s tax system which currently favours asset speculation over building productive businesses and products – we’ll come to the tax impasse later.

    Infrastructure

    National objective 3. Australia will implement a systematic national framework for developing, financing and maintaining nationally significant infrastructure that will assist governments and the private sector to plan and prioritise infrastructure needs at least 20 years ahead.

    This section is a sour sick joke which illustrates all that is wrong with Australian governments at all levels. Infrastructure planning for the next 20 years should largely be in place now and the fact it seen as being a national objective by the authors of this report

    At best this section of the report reads like an ode to the corporatist ideologies of the 1980s and in fact illustrates exactly where Australia lost its way in the 1990s as the country’s business leaders realised that Asia was too hard when there were easy pickings in convincing gullible Liberal and Labor governments into selling assets cheaply and exploiting the resultant monopolies.

    Communications infrastructure

    National objective 4. Australia’s communications infrastructure and markets will be world leading and support the rapid exchange and spread of ideas and commerce in the Asian region.

    This is a fine objective and may be achievable if the National Broadband Network is rolled out on time and isn’t affected by poor management decisions or gutted in an act of political bastardry by a future Liberal government.

    Hopefully this is one are where actions will meet the the report’s words.

    Taxation

    National objective 5. Australia’s tax and transfer system will be efficient and fair, encouraging continued investment in the capital base and greater participation in the workforce, while delivering sustainable revenues to support economic growth by meeting public and social needs.

    In 2007 the then Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd appointed Ken Henry to review the Australian tax system. That report was comprehensively ignored and the effects of the political bumbling around that lead to Rudd’s axing as Prime Minister and Gillard’s incompetent half-baked Mining Tax.

    To have an efficient and fair tax system which encourages investors and workers should be a given. That it has to be spelt out, and then ignored, probably illustrates the greatest failure of Australia’s political and business leaders.

    Australia’s current tax system is probably the economy’s greatest weakness as much of the resilience boasted of in the report is based around stimulating the housing market, the wealth effect in turn is reflected in the country’s affluence measures.

    Reforming the Australian tax system to favour workers and investors over property speculators is going to require great strength by the politicians who attempt to do it and they’ll need the reform of business leaders and the financial media. None of these three groups have the courage or integrity to be trusted to carry this out in the next 15 years.

    Reforming regulation

    National objective 6. Australia will be among the most efficiently regulated places in the world, in the top five globally, reducing business costs by billions of dollars a year.

    Possibly the greatest hubris in today’s Australia is about the efficiency of the nation’s regulators. In reality Australia is a country that’s quick to legislate but slow to regulate.

    We’re very good at passing laws and regulations, not to mention building bureaucracies of thousands of memo writers to oversee these rules, but we aren’t very good at actually enforcing them.

    Real reform in regulation is essential to a resilient Australian economy, but like taxation reform this is a complex and thankless task for any politician who attempts it.

    Sustainability

    National objective 7. The Australian economy and our environmental assets will be managed sustainably to ensure the wellbeing of future generations of Australians.

    A worthy objective – unfortunately the ideological war that saving the Murray-Darling has become, the bitter argument over the carbon tax and Australia’s rejection of clean tech entrepreneurs makes one wonder exactly where the country can have a competitive advantage in this area.

    One rare note of warning with this report identifies sustainability issues as affecting Australia’s ability to supply food to the growing Asian economies. This is a fair warning but its unlikely opportunistic politicians at all levels care too much to distract them from politicising discussion on the sustainability of various Australian communities and industries.

    Sound economic policies

    National objective 8. Australia’s macroeconomic and financial frameworks will remain among the world’s best through this period of change.

    Approaching this section fills one with dread at the prospect with being served up with more hubris wrapped around Australian exceptionalism.

    While the section doesn’t disappoint in this aspect, the writers have identified serious weaknesses in the funding structures and regulation in the capital markets. This probably reflects Ken Henry’s background in the Treasury.

    The not unexpected emphasis on AAA credit ratings and the size of the Australian superannuation industry make one wonder why we bother with restrictive economic policies when we clearly have the capacity to fund productive national investment.

    All the criticisms of the earlier parts of this chapter flow from this bizarre form of Australian Austerity that has crippled investment in education and infrastructure over the last thirty years and ditching that mentality could be the greatest reform of all.

    Every objective objective in the chapter is worthy and true, but state and Federal government actions are acting directly in the opposite direction to the stated intentions of the chapter. The introduction says;

    We have made substantial reforms and investments across the five pillars of productivity—skills and education, innovation, infrastructure, tax reform and regulatory reform—and these efforts will continue.

    This is not true – in almost every single one of these areas, Australia has been at best treading water. Just in the weeks before this report was released the Federal government’s mini-budget further cut innovation incentives.

    The New South Wales government announced in the week the report was released that it would de-skill the state’s workforce even further by following the TAFE “reforms” introduced by Victoria and Queensland which have seen industry training reduced to churing out pointless barista and nail grooming certificates.

    At the same time, the regulation “reforms” introduced by successive Liberal and Labor governments at state and Federal levels have followed the 1980s ideologies of gifting assets to ticket clipping managerial and banking classes. Nowhere is this more apparent in the debacle of Australia’s soaring power bills which are becoming a real competitive disadvantage to the nation.

    Infrastructure is probably the biggest failure of successive governments, the same corporatist ideologies of the Liberal and Labor Parties of the last 30 years have prevented the construction of infrastructure beyond toll roads which favour the same ticket clipping bankers.

    Much of Australia’s core transport infrastructure such as power companies, railways and ports have been sold off to the ticket clippers who have in turn “sweated” these assets by charging monopoly prices while spending the bare minimum to keep them running.

    At present Australia has a resilient and productive economy, as did Ireland and Spain before the economic winds turned against them. It’s hard not to think that if a similar report had been written in Madrid or Dublin five years ago the same chapter would have read much the same as Australia’s today.

    The big challenge will come for Australia when China, India, South Korea or Japan hit a tough spot.

    Even with the rose glass projections of the previous three chapters of Australia in the Asian Century, it’s at least reassuring there are a few notes of warning in this section of the report.

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  • Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Four: The outlook for Australia to 2025

    Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Four: The outlook for Australia to 2025

    This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report.

    Chapter four of Australia in the Asian Century is the critical part of the white paper, describing where the opportunities and risks are for the nation as Asian societies become more prosperous.

    In the introduction to the chapter, “Australia’s 2025 Aspiration” is set out as raising per person income to $73,000 by 2025 and the nation’s living standards in the world’s top ten.

    While this is a noble target, the underpinning of that good fortune are more of the same;

    What will emerge as a result of these opportunities is that Australia’s trade patterns will change, urbanisation will continue to drive demand for resources and energy, and new opportunities will emerge in manufacturing and in high-quality food production. Rising incomes will also provide opportunities for the education and tourism sectors, and for services more broadly.

    Iron ore, coal and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) are the basis of the projections in this chapter which, as discussed in the previous chapter, ignores alternative supplies from Africa, Mongolia and Central Asia along with the efforts of China to reduce energy density while expanding renewable power sources.

    Agriculture also has a role as does tourism and education but all of the projections are more of the same 1980s thinking we read in the previous chapter. There’s little that identifies new industries or the evolution of existing export agricultural industries such meat exports.

    The identification of risks to this rose coloured outlook skims over any internal issues such as drought, industrial disruption, a continued high exchange rate or any external factors.

    While the chapter does note the risk of commodity prices could fall further than expected, the consequences of this are dismissed with an airy reference to Australia’s fiscal position.

    While the chapter focuses on motherhood statements about innovation, research and development and ‘complex problem solving’ when looking at the opportunities there are some identifications of the real advantages Australia offers;

    Australian society reflects our multiculturalism. Australia’s socially cohesive and diverse nation is one of our enduring strengths. Our nation brings the values of fairness and tolerance to all its dealings in the region and the world.

    It’s a shame there isn’t more emphasis on this aspect as this is one of the areas where Australia can add value and has real competitive advantage.

    Overall, the Outlook described in Chapter Four of Australia in the Asian Century suffers from the same problem as the previous chapter of applying the 1970s and 80s experience with Japan and South Korea onto the development of China and India.

    What’s even more frustrating is the only specific projections are for more mineral and agricultural exports, everything else is wrapped in motherhood statements.

    The following chapters look at the specifics of Australia’s development and engagement with Asia over the next decade.

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  • Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Three: Australia in Asia

    Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Three: Australia in Asia

    This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

    The third Chapter of the Australia in the Asian Century report, “Australia in Asia” attempts to define the role the country currently plays in the region. In some ways this is the most constructive part of the paper in that it describes the lost opportunities of the last 25 years.

    Much of the early part of the chapter traces the development of Australia’s engagement with Asia after World War II; Chifley’s post war efforts with the United Nations, Menzies’ engagement with Japan, Whitlam’s going to China, Fraser’s opening to Vietnamese immigration and Hawke’s work on building the APEC agreement are all noted.

    Again are the major wars that also formed Australia’s current position in East Asia – World War II, the Malayan Emergency, the Korean and Vietnamese wars – are barely mentioned. This trivialises some of the major influences in today’s complex tapestry of relationships

    Of Australia’s closest Asian neighbour, the fall of Sukarno gets a brief nod but Suharto’s removal, the rise of Indonesian democracy and East Timor are all removed from the narrative. There is also no mention of other internal dislocations like the Cultural Revolution or the Indian Partition, all which still have echos today.

    In the introduction the Colombo Plan gets a mention and it’s worth reflecting upon its effects.

    When I worked in Bangkok in the early 1990s there were a number of business leaders who had been educated in Australia under Colombo Plan scholarships.

    That investment by Australia paid dividends through the 1980s and 90s as many of those scholarship students were ardent supporters of Australian businesses and government.

    One wonders how today’s students who’ve been treated as milk cows by Australian governments and “seats on bums” to education institutions will feel about the country when they enter business and political leadership positions over the next decade?

    The examples of Australian business engagement in Asia are interesting – Blundstone’s is a straight out manufacturing outsourcing story which doesn’t really describe anything not being done by thousands of other businesses while Tangalooma Island Resort is a light of hope in the distressed Australian tourism industry.

    A notable omission is how digital media, apps developers and service businesses are faring in Asia. There are many good case studies in those sectors but the writers seem to be, once again, fixated on the trade patterns of the 1980s and 90s rather than success stories in new fields and emerging technologies.

    Generally though the description of the Australian economy is again more of the same; a combination of self congratulations on having a government AAA credit rating, hubris over avoiding a GFC induced recession and stating how the services sector has risen to replace the manufacturing that’s been outsourced by companies like Blundstone.

    Overall Chapter Three of the Australia in the Asian Century report illustrates the opportunities missed in the last 25 years. Had this report been written twenty years ago it could have forecast a booming relationship in the services and advanced manufacturing sectors. It almost certainly would have included an observation that the days of the Australian economy depending upon minerals exports is over.

    What a difference a couple of decades make.

    The engagement of Australia with Asia concludes with a look at the changes to the nation’s immigration intakes and demographic composition. This point is, quite rightly, identified as an area of opportunity.

    Having Thai restaurants in every suburb and Indian doctors in most country town isn’t really taking advantage of the opportunities presented by having a diverse population and workforce. Chapter Four attempts to look at how these factors, and others, can help Australia’s engagement with the Asian economies.

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  • Being careful what you wish for

    Being careful what you wish for

    Economist Yanis Varoufakis posted the conclusion of his speech to British Euroceptics this week with the warning “the cruellest God is the one who grants us our wishes”.

    In a time of austerity this is something we all should carefully consider. Some of these people need to be careful about their wishes;

    • Those renters hoping for property prices to drop 40% may get their wish, but such a crash will leave the economy in ruins and the renters themselves without a job to service their mortgage.
    • Landlords who fantasise about rents tripling, not realising that ripping disposable income out of their tenants’ wallets will also push the economy into recession and hurt their property values.
    • Politicians obsessing about AAA credit ratings without understanding that this locks a government into the narrow, failed ideologies of the ratings agencies – the world’s most incompetent and corrupt organisations.
    • Business leaders demanding that workers be thankful for getting $1 a hour, forgetting that Henry Ford started paying his workers so they could buy his cars and pay executive bonuses.
    • Retired folk reducing their assets to get pensions because “they’ve paid their taxes” who then find life on the aged pension isn’t so great after all.
    • Middle classes urging the government to subsidise their private school fees and medical insurance because “they pay their taxes” and end up paying even more taxes.

    Yanis himself is an interesting guy, having amongst other things taught economics in Sydney for 12 years before returning to Greece;

    In 2000 a combination of nostalgia and abhorrence of the conservative turn of the land down under (under the government of that awful little man, John Howard) led me to return to Greece.

    John Howard himself wished for Australia to return to the “white picket fence” conservative, insular nation of the 1950s. He got his wish and Australians decided they liked the past so much they decided to take the economy back to an 1850s structure of living off the sheep’s iron ore train’s back.

    Today Australia’s inward looking and insular with an economy increasingly based upon mineral exports and property speculation. With both the export markets and property prices now wobbling we might be about to find the cost of our wishes being granted.

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  • Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Two: The future of Asia

    Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Two: The future of Asia

    This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

    “Asia’s economic resurgence is set to continue” is the bold statement at the beginning of Chapter Two of the Australia in the Asian Century report and with that the chapter immediately falls back to warm motherhood statements;

    Average living standards are set to improve dramatically and transform the way people live and work. Asia’s economies are projected to expand at a strong rate. The region’s expansion and development will change the contours of Asia and the globe—opening up exciting new opportunities, while also posing some challenges.

    All of this is true, however the report struggles to identify exactly what those challenges and opportunities are as Asia develops and where Australians fit into the region’s evolving economy.

    Demographics will matter, but they are not destiny

    The constant mantra through the report is “demographics will matter, but they are not destiny.” Yet, despite the headline, Chapter Two illustrates that so far it has been destiny.

    Graph 2.6 of the report shows how Japan’s, and now South Korea’s, productivity has tailed off as the population has aged. This is to be expected when economic expansion has been based on labour intensive manufacturing, as China’s is today.

    Frustratingly, the report acknowledges this with the following paragraph;

    But the fruits of adopting new technology and adapting it will become harder to harvest. A point will come, though it’s still some way off, where the growth of labour productivity in developing Asian economies will slow—opportunities for gains from importing foreign technology and for shifting workers from agriculture to industry will diminish.

    “Some point in the future” doesn’t wash when the rest of the chapter shows off various ‘firm’ numbers estimating ‘base’, ‘low’ and ‘high’ growth rates. If you can quantify those growth assumptions, then it should be fairly trivial to estimate the turning point where aging populations start to affect China.

    Luckily others have done this work, the Australian Macrobusiness site suggests that turning point could be as early as 2015. In which case, unlike Japan and South Korea, China will have got old before it got rich.

    If this true, then IMF’s projected growth rates will miss their targets – particularly the ‘low growth’ scenario which is almost identical to their ‘base scenario’.

    Rise of the middle class

    Much of the emphasis in this view of Asia’s development is on the rise of the middle class and the report features a case study of Hitesh, a middle class stockbroker in Ahmedabad.

    While there’s no doubt Hitesh and his family’s income and standard of living are rising, the idea that several hundred million Indian and Chinese will jump to European or North American income levels before 2025 is improbable.

    Most stockbrokers in New York, London or Sydney earn between 30 and 300 times Hitesh’s $5,000 a year and in 2010, average Chinese income was a tenth of the US.

    Even if the Indian and Chinese middle classes did manage a tenfold growth in income over the next decade, the assumption they would adopt the debt driven high consumption patterns of the US or Australia isn’t a given as we see in how the Japanese middle classes haven’t aped the spending behaviour of their profligate Western friends.

    The credit and banking points in this chapter illustrate the hubris mentioned in my original overview of Australia in the Asian Century.

    And with financial systems in advanced economies unwinding the high debt levels built up before the Global Financial Crisis, financial institutions in stronger economic positions, such as those in Australia and elsewhere in the Asian region, will have opportunities to expand into new markets.

    Given the dire records of Australian banks in expanding overseas along with the “stronger economic position” being due more to government guarantees during the GFC and the desperate political desire to prop up Australia’s property market at all costs, it’s difficult to see exactly what Australian institutions have to offer Asian savers except to further underwrite the never ending down under housing bubble.

    Chapter two of the Australia in the Asian Century report finishes with an overview of the current geopolitical situation which is notable more for what has been left out. This is again probably due to Canberra public service politics and the report suffers for it.

    One major region left out is Central Asia and Russia – outstanding given the report’s view  that a resource poor Asia (that Japanese assumption again) will need Australia to fuel its energy and resources needs – which ignores the construction of pipelines and railways to China and India.

    Also missed are the projects to upgrade China’s railway and road links to Europe and Central Asia. These in themselves may trigger major geopolitical changes over the next few years, as we’re seeing today in Tibet and Xinjiang after railways were built to Kashgar to Lhasa. Yet none of this is considered.

    Not the ‘Stans should feel aggrieved, like the rest of the report the emphasis is on China and India with scant mention of other Asian countries.

    For Australia, much of the hope in the report seems to be in providing raw materials for Asia’s industrialising and urbanising societies along with being a holiday destination and education provider. This is all lazy 1980s thinking which projects Australia’s Japanese experience of thirty years ago onto China and India today.

    The predictions of Asia’s future in the Australia in the Asian Century report are largely are a continuation of the status quo. If this report had been written in 1960, it may have picked the rise of Japan over the following twenty years but the main focus would have been on Burma as Asia’s richest independent country.

    Exacerbating the report’s weakness are the assumptions that development paths will follow the same course as Japan, Taiwan or South Korea in the late 20th Century.

    Development wasn’t a smooth path in all three of those countries and each had their own unique political and economic upheavals in that time, the failure to recognise that similar disruptions will happen in Asia’s emerging economies as they develop is probably the greatest weakness in the entire report.

    It’s very easy to draw straight lines on graphs based on ‘best case’ IMF projections but history is rarely linear. This is probably the greatest intellectual failing of the white paper.

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