Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter One: The rise of Asia

Chapter one of Australia in the Asian Century looks at how the region’s economies developed

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

“Just over two decades ago, the Australian Government commissioned a study of Australia and the Northeast Asian ascendancy” starts the opening of the Australia in the Asian Century report. That sentence describes how this paper is the latest of Australia’s earnest efforts to understand the region.

The opening chapter of the report follows the sensible principle that to plan for the future we have to first understand the present so this section seeks to explain the development of various Asian economies and put those changes into an Australian perspective.

Notable in the narrative is the North East Asian focus, while India gets a brief mention most of the story revolves around the development of China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Chart 1.2, “Asia’s economic dividend” gives the game away when all but one ‘Asian’ country listed is East Asian.

Russia, along with most of South and Central Asia – not to mention other Asia countries like Iran, Turkey and the former Soviet Republics – rate no mention all.

The narratives around the countries which are covered is also deficient – for instance the discussion on Japan’s, South Korea’s and Vietnam’s developments totally ignore post-war reconstruction efforts and their relations with the United States.

China does get a more detailed examination rightly noting it was the country’s admission to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 that really set the economy’s export sector moving, however it skates over the massive dislocations and market reforms introduced in the 1980s which laid the foundations for China’s successful bid to join the WTO.

More notably, the analysis overlooks – probably to avoid upsetting PRC diplomats and making life difficult in Canberra – the role of Taiwanese investment in China and Taiwan’s development itself.

In a similar vein the scant discussion of India misses the role of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the country’s economic development along with the concentration of power in the various industrial conglomerates like the Tata Group.

Again, the same omission is made when discussing the South Korean Chaebols and Japanese Keiretsu. Given the investments made in Australia by all of these industrial conglomerates it’s curious they barely rate a mention in discussing Asia’s industrialisation process.

The discussion on innovation in Chapter 1.3 is useful however it lacks substance in identifying exactly which sectors various Asian economies are specialising in and which industries are in decline as various countries move up the value chain.

Singapore’s success in becoming East Asia’s hub for banking and corporate regional headquarters is a notable omission and again one has a suspicion this is because of ongoing Australian governments’ doomed ambitions to establish Sydney as a regional financial and business centre.

Probably the most glaring omission in Chapter One though is the role of the United States. In tracking the rise of the Indian service sector or Chinese, Japanese and South Korean manufacturing the trade policies of the US cannot be ignored. And yet they largely are.

That failure to acknowledge the US role means report overlooks the Clinton and Bush I Administrations’ forced opening East Asia’s largely closed economies which radically changed South Korea, Taiwan and Japan in the late 1980s and early 90s. Not to mention the critical role the US had during that period in allowing China and Vietnam to join the global trade networks.

Chapter One of Australia in the Asian Century is an unsatisfactory introduction to the complexities of the Asian economies and one suspects is because of the compromises made to assuage the egos and groupthink of Canberra’s mandarins and politicians.

Most importantly, it fails to put the last thirty years’ developments in Asia into an Australian context or perspective. In this respect, it’s a fitting start to a largely inadequate report.

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Enter the Dragon

The development of Aliyun, a mobile phone software package, illustrates how Chinese industry is moving up the value chain.

Once up a time our parents laughed at the tinny little Japanese cars – in the 1960s companies with silly names like Toyota and Mazda could never threaten world giants like Chrysler, Ford and General Motors.

Within two decades the Japanese had moved their products up the value chain leaving their American and European competitors running scared while governments in western countries offered the new leaders of the manufacturing industries bribes to set up plants in their towns and states.

It was always obvious China would follow the same course as the Japanese, particularly given the country’s position as the world’s cheap labor supplier had a time limit thanks to the demographic effects of the 1970s One Child Policy.

So it’s no surprise that Alibaba, China’s biggest e-commerce service, has built its own mobile operating system to compete with Google’s Android.

If Aliyun follows the Japanese development path, the first version is terrible but within five years – the development cycle of software is a lot quicker than that of cars – Alibaba will be a viable competitor to Google and Android.

Chinese developers moving into the mobile market is terrible news for the also rans like Microsoft and Blackberry. As Apple dominate the premium mobile sector and Android the mass market, it’s very hard for those running third or lower to achieve the critical mass needed to be competitive. Aliyun makes it much harder for them to gain any traction in high growth developing markets.

An interesting aspect of the Wall Street Journal’s story is how Aliyun is aimed at the domestic Chinese market for the moment. This is part of China’s economy moving away from being overly reliant on exports, having locally made products that meet the needs and aspirations of a growing domestic economy is an important part of this process.

Exports though will remain an important part of the Chinese economy for most of this century and value added products like Aliyun will be important for China as the cheap labour advantage erodes over the next two decades.

Businesses who think their markets are protected because their quality is better than their Chinese competitors may be in for a nasty shock, just like the 20th Century auto makers who dismissed the Japanese were in the 1970s.

Whether Aliyun is successful or not, we’re once again seeing many of the facile assumptions about Chinese growth being tested as the country’s economy and society evolves.

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Six billion pairs of socks

How shallow beliefs don’t substitute for economic analysis or business sense

Ever since the days of Napoleon business people have lusted over the idea of selling into the Chinese market – the idea of a billion people clambering to buy just one widget each brings a gleam to the eyes of even jaded entrepreneurs.

When Deng Xaioping opened the Chinese economy in the mid 1980s Australian brewers, Swiss watchmakers and German motor manufacturers rushed into the country believing that a billion liberated peasants would rush to buy expensive beer and watches.

As it turned out, the real opportunities for foreigners were in the other direction. When China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001 the boom that had already started in the Special Economic Zones along the southern Chinese coast spread across the Eastern provinces as manufacturing from Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan to find cheaper labour.

300km South-West of Shanghai the city of Datang became “sock town” where local companies manufactured a third of the world’s sock supply.

Chinese sock manufacturers became so competitive that their Japanese counterparts were forced to move upmarket in an effort to secure a position in an industry awash with cheap products.

Today the Chinese sock industry is looking sick as manufacturers go broke and inventories pile up reports The Observer.

Excess capacity is a problem in many industries, particularly motor manufacturing where governments around the world have supported their local producers resulting in a glut of cars and trucks. Socks are no exception to the laws of supply and demand.

The travails of China’s sock industry are a cautionary tale for those who project straight lines for Chinese growth.

Facile assumptions that every man, woman and child on the planet needs to buy two pairs of socks a year, or that China will build millions of steel hungry apartments each year, is not economic analysis and any business built on such shaky beliefs is leaving itself vulnerable when things don’t work out.

The same is true for nations. Hollow assumptions can put an entire economy on shaky ground. Just thinking that every Chinese family needs six pairs of socks doesn’t guarantee economic success.

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