What happened to the not so nifty fifty?

Assuming an investment is safe because a business is big could turn out to be costly as 1970s investors found.

One of the must read investment blogs is John Mauldin’s weekly Thoughts From the Frontline. This week’s post is a particularly compelling guest post from tech investor Andy Kessler.

Kessler’s post is the forward to George Gilder’s book Knowledge and Power and in describing his investment journey Kessler mentions the 1970s Wall Street view of investing in Nifty Fifty, the fifty biggest stocks on the US market which – because they were perceived as safe investments – traded on substantial price equity ratios.

Trading cost 75 cents a share, but who cares, there were only 50 stocks that mattered, the Nifty Fifty, and you just bought ’em, never sold.

Towards the end of 1972, Xerox traded for 49 times earnings, Avon for 65 times earnings, Polaroid for 91 times earnings.

Numbers like that were unsustainable and those days of safe investing couldn’t last. So what happened to The Nifty Fifty?

It’s hard to track down today’s figures but an academic paper from 2002 looked at how those stocks performed over the following thirty years. It isn’t pretty.

nifty-fifty-annualised-returns

Few of the Nifty Fifty performed well over the subsequent thirty years, which should give pause for those just buying the top stocks like the Dow-Jones, FTSE 100 or ASX 20 – just because they are big doesn’t mean they are safe.

In fact names like Eastman-Kodak, Polaroid and Digital Equipment Corporation on the Nifty Fifty shows just how risky such assumptions are.

Kessler also has a good point about today’s index huggers who are the modern equivalent of the 1970s buyers of the Nifty Fifty.

An index is the market. It’s a carrier, a channel, as defined mathematically by Shannon at Bell Labs in his seminal work on Information Theory. An index can only yield the predictable market return, mostly devoid of the profits of creativity and innovation, which largely come from new companies outside the index.

Like the Nifty Fifty today’s index funds are safe and predictable – until they’re not – while at the margins, the next great businesses and industries are being built far from the attention of the funds managers.

For Australians there’s a particular sting in the tail from Kessler’s post as the bulk of compulsory superannuation goes into the local market’s stop stocks. It wouldn’t be too unfair to describe the modern Aussie funds manager’s motto as being “buy the ASX Eight and have lunch with your mate.”

Forty years ago, an investment in Eastman Kodak would have looked pretty nifty. Today Kodak has gone. We should remember that when we’re looking for ‘safe’ places to put our money.

Bull Market image by Myles through SXC.HU

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Venture capital’s false jackpot

Thinking that raising capital is a jackpot prize misses the point of a much bigger business journey.

When a business run by a 22 year old raises 25 million dollars it certainly gets attention and Crinkle’s successful seed funding has provoked plenty of commentary.

Particularly notable are stories like the gush piece from the New Yorker magazine calling the fund raising “a $25 million jackpot.” Reading those, those, you’d think Crinkle’s Lucas Duplan had won the lottery.

The truth is, getting a fat cheque from investors is only the beginning of the business journey; the real work starts when you have a board and shareholders to answer to.

Where the real jackpot lies is in selling the business to a greater fool and the story of Bebo founder Michael Birch is a good example.

Bebo was bought by AOL, probably the greatest greater idiot buyer of all, in 2008 for $850 million. Five yearrs later Birch has bought it back for one million and promises to ‘reinvent” the social media service.

While Birch didn’t get all the $850 million AOL spent on Bebo, he and his investors did hit the jackpot. Whether Lucas Duplan and the backers of Crinkle do is for history to tell us.

Image courtesy of sgman through sxc.hu

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When Venture Capital meets its own disruption

Falling barriers to entry are disrupting Venture Capital investors as much as incumbent managers.

Tech industry veteran Paul Graham always offers challenging thoughts about the Silicon Valley business environment on his Y Combinator blog.

Last month’s post looks at investment trends and how the venture capital industry itself is being disrupted as startups become cheaper to fund. He also touches on a profound change in the modern business environment.

Graham’s point is Venture Capital firms are finding their equity stakes eroding as it becomes easier and cheaper for founders to fund their business, as a result VC terms are steadily becoming less demanding.

An interesting observation from Graham is how the attitude of graduates towards starting up businesses has changed.

When I graduated from college in 1986, there were essentially two options: get a job or go to grad school. Now there’s a third: start your own company. That’s a big change. In principle it was possible to start your own company in 1986 too, but it didn’t seem like a real possibility. It seemed possible to start a consulting company, or a niche product company, but it didn’t seem possible to start a company that would become big.

That isn’t true – people like Michael Dell, Bill Gates and Steve Jobs were creating companies that were already successes by 1986 – the difference was that startup companies in the 1980s were founded by college dropouts, not graduates of Cornell or Harvard.

In the current dot com mania, it’s now acceptable for graduates of mainstream universities to look at starting up business. For this we can probably thank Sergey Brin and Larry Page for showing how graduates can create a massive success with Google.

One wonders though how long this will last, for many of the twenty and early thirty somethings taking a punt on some start ups the option of going back to work for a consulting firm is always there. Get in your late 30s or early 40s and suddenly options start running out if you haven’t hit that big home run and found a greater fool.

There’s also the risk that the current startup mania will run out of steam, right now it’s sexy but stories like 25 million dollar investments in businesses that are barely past their concept phase do indicate the current dot com boom is approaching its peak, if it isn’t there already.

Where Graham is spot on though is that the 19th and 20th Century methods of industrial organisation are evolving into something else as technology breaks down silos and conglomerates. This is something that current executives, and those at university hoping to be the next generation of managers, should keep in mind.

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Staging a sales blitzkreig to win the market battle

Retailer The Iconic is a good example of the Silicon Valley greater fool model

Part of the Silicon Valley greater fool model requires ramping whatever metrics are necessary — page views, unique visitors, revenue or profit to attract prospective buyers to acquire the business.

Elizabeth Knight in the Sydney Morning Herald looks at the cracks appearing in online retailer The Iconic where revenues of thirty million dollars were subsidised by forty-four million in losses in the e-commerce operator’s first year of trading.

The Iconic has all the hallmarks of a classic ‘buy me’ Silicon Valley operation — big marketing spend, high customer acquisition costs and fat operating losses in an effort to build market share.

Getting market share is one of the key aspects of the greater fool model, being the leader in a segment almost guarantees a buyer, usually the one of the shellshocked incumbents.

Knight quotes emails from one of The Iconic’s founders, Oliver Samwar, on the importance of being number one in their sector.

‘‘The only thing is that the time of the Blitzkrieg must be chosen wisely so that each country tells me with blood when it is time. I am ready – anytime!’’ one said.

‘‘We must be number one latest in the last month of next season. Full month, not a discount sales month

‘‘Why? Because only number one can raise unbelievable money at unbelievable valuations. I cannot raise money for number 2 etc and I have seen it how easy (sic) it is for me in Brazil and how difficult in Russia because our team f….d up.’’

As we’ve seen with companies like Groupon, being number one can impress gullible corporations but when that market position has been bought by investor’s money subsidising operations, the business is rarely sustainable.

Whether investors are prepared to continue subsidising The Iconic’s losses or if the business can attract a buyer will depend upon the business maintaining momentum on its key metrics.

Probably the most important thing for companies like The Iconic though is the availability of easy credit and accessible funds.

As we saw in the original dot com boom, when that easy money evaporates so to do most of the businesses.

For the incumbent businesses threatened by well funded upstarts, some might find the best hope for survival is to hope challengers run out of money.

In the meantime though, they may have to survive a market blitzkrieg.

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IT industry feuds are buried as business models collapse

The collapsing personal computing and server markets are forcing once powerful competitors to bury animosities and feuds as industry giants face a troubled future.

The collapsing personal computing and server markets are forcing once powerful competitors to bury animosities and feuds as industry giants face a troubled future.

Samsung’s exit from selling desktop computers illustrates how quickly the PC industry is collapsing which underscores Michael Dell’s urgency in his attempts to take Dell Computer private along with the spectacle of once hostile competitors like Oracle and Microsoft embracing each other.

Earlier this week Microsoft Australia hosted a briefing at their North Ryde office to show what the company is doing with their Azure cloud computing service, which is part of the company’s quest to find revenues in the post-PC world.

Microsoft are quickly adapting to the new marketplace. This week in Madrid, the company hosted their European TechEd conference where they showed off their Cloud First design principles of software built around online services rather than servers and desktop PCs.

One important part of Microsoft’s cloud strategy is establishing pairs of data centres to provide continuity to the various zones, including China, across the globe. Each individual centre is at least 400 miles apart from its twin to avoid interruptions from natural disasters.

Interestingly, this is the opposite of Google’s data centre strategy and quite different from how Amazon offers its data services where customers can choose the zones and level of redundancy they want.

There’s no real reason to think any of these three different philosophies are flawed, it’s a difference in implementation and each approach brings its own advantages and downsides which customers are going to have choose between.

While Microsoft is showing off its new direction, HP CEO Meg Whitman was in Beijing proclaiming that “HP is here to stay” and laying out the company’s path to survival in the post-PC world.

Like Microsoft, HP is putting bets on cloud computing and China, Whitman emphasized the work she’s been doing engaging with Chinese companies while promising “a new style of IT” and that “HP is in China for China.”

A key difference to Microsoft and Dell is that HP is doubling down on its desktop and server businesses with a focus on selling into the Chinese market. This is a high risk move given China’s investment into high speed networks and the global nature of the cloud computing movement.

One of the boasts of Whitman and her management team is that HP have added a thousand Chinese channel partners over the last twelve months, this is an effort to replicate Microsoft’s market strength in mature markets which has given the software giant breathing space against strong, cashed up competitors like Google and Apple.

Whether this works for HP in China remains to be seen, in the meantime Microsoft are trying to move their huge channel partner community onto the cloud with various offerings that give integrators who’ve traditionally made money selling servers and desktops some opportunity to sell online services.

A selling point for Microsoft is yesterday’s announcement they will offer Oracle databases on their Azure platform. The ending of animosities between Microsoft and Oracle is an illustration of just how the collapse in the PC and server markets is forcing market giants to forget old feuds and build new alliances.

With the server and personal computing markets being turned upside down, we’re going to see more unthinkable alliances and pivoting corporations as once untouchable industry giants realise the threats facing them.

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Telling the broadband story – the government makes its case

The minister’s office replies to my NBN criticisms and illustrates how the broadband story isn’t being told

Further to yesterday’s post about NBNCo’s inability to tell a story, I received a polite message from the long suffering staff at the Minister’s office that pointed me to some of the resources that NBNCo and the Department of  Broadband, Communications and Digital economy have posted.

Here’s the list of case studies and videos;

http://www.nbn.gov.au/nbn-advertising/nbn-case-studies/

http://www.nbnco.com.au/nbn-for-business/case-studies.html

http://www.nbn.gov.au/case-study/noella-babui-business/

http://www.nbn.gov.au/case-study/seren-trump-small-home-based-business-owner/

All of these case studies are nice, but they illustrate the problem – they’re nice, standard government issue media releases. The original CNet story that triggered yesterday’s story tells real stories that are more than just sanitised government PR.

It also begs the question of where the hell are all these people successfully using the NBN when I ask around about them?

What’s even more frustrating is the Sydney Morning Herald seems to get spoon fed these type of stories.

The really irritating thing with stories like yesterday’s SMH piece is that it’s intended to promote the Digital Rural Futures Conference on the future of farming being held by the University of New England.

Now this is something I’d would have gone to had I known about it and I’d have paid my own fares and accommodation. Yet the first I know about this conference is an article on a Saturday four days out from the event. That’s not what you’d call good PR.

The poor public relations strategies of the Digital Rural Futures Conference is a symptom of the National Broadband’s Network’s proponents’ inability to get their message out the wider public.

When we look back at the debacle that was the debate about Australia’s role in the 21st Century, it’s hard not to think the failure to articulate the importance of modernising the nation’s communications systems will be one of the key studies in how we blew it.

Despite the best efforts of a few switched on people in Senator Conroy’s office, a lot more effort is needed to make the case for a national broadband and national investment in today’s technologies which are going to define the future.

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Australia’s economic rigor mortis

Australia has become too complacent in a competitive world warns one US business leader.

This is worth watching, Dow Chemical CEO Andrew Liveris and Australian Business Council chief Tony Shepherd spoke on Sunday with Alan Kohler on the ABC’s Inside Business.

At 5.40 Andrew Liveris says Australia is suffering a state of economic rigor mortis – “we’ve lost the ability to innovate” – with no plans and a great complacency. It’s something all Aussies should reflect upon, although don’t expect these blokes to be any help.

 

 

 

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