Tag: china

Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter 8: Building sustainable security in the region

What are the security issues for the Asia in the 21st Century

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report.

The eighth chapter of Australia in the Asian Century looks at the security picture of the region, this is one of the bigger chapters and like some of the others it’s as notable for what it leaves out as for what it says.

National objective 20. Australian policies will contribute to Asia’s development as a region of sustainable security in which habits of cooperation are the norm.

That’s nice, worthy and has been undoubtedly true for most previous Australian governments. Except of course when Australian Prime Ministers join the prevailing colonial power in wars like Iraq, Afghanistan, Malaya, Korea, Vietnam or kicking around the German territories in World War I.

Chapter Eight partly dives into territory already covered in Chapter Three, this time though the analysis does discuss the United States’ role in more detail and makes the observation that US military spending dwarfs that of any other Asian nation – interestingly this is one of the few times Russia gets a mention in the entire report.

Encouragingly, the paper doesn’t confine the concept of ‘security’ just to military matters and takes a broader view of issues such as guaranteeing access to resources, food and water. There is some discussion of climate change and on regional responses to natural disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes.

One notable omission is that of refugees. Given that most of the asylum seekers arriving by boat are Asian – currently coming from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka – and almost all pass through other Asian countries, it would be expected this issue would get some exploration. Sadly it doesn’t and once again skirting over an important issue detracts from the paper’s substance.

As befits Australia’s most important relationships in Asia, there is a lot of discussion of the three way relationship between China, the United States and Australia with a detailed breakout box in section 8.4.

The discussion on Australia’s relations between China and the US makes an interesting statement;

In managing the intersections of Australia’s ties with the United States and China, we will need a clear sense of our national interests, a strong voice in both relationships and effective diplomacy.

Undoubtedly this statement is true, however successive Australian governments have conflated the interests of the United States with being the same as Australia’s. In recent times Australian leaders have followed the US lead even when it has been clear American policy conflicts with Australia’s Chinese relations.

Moving away from a reflex support of the United States is going to be one of the biggest challenges for Australian governments in the Asian Century and one hopes the process is as gradual and incident free as the white paper hopes.

National objective 21.The region will be more sustainable and human security will be strengthened with the development of resilient markets for basic needs such as energy, food and water.

National objective 21 is an interesting statement in itself – “resilient markets for basic needs such as energy, food and water” smacks of the 1980s privatisation and corporatism that has left Australia with duopoly industries and an excessive financialisation of those markets for basic needs.

It may well turn out to be the case that Asian countries choose not to follow that path, particularly those like the Philippines and Indonesia who have experienced the effects of crony capitalism in recent history.

Chapter 8 of Australia in the Asian Century finishes with a detailed look at the regional efforts aimed at building trust and co-operation on trans-national issues.  Much is made of various international groups such as the G20 and the UN.

An interesting case study is that of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty with an examination of Japan’s and Australia’s work in that field. Sadly this is another area that’s let down by the actions of current and previous Australian governments in selling uranium to India.

The nuclear weapons stand off between India, Pakistan and China is another ‘elephant in the room’ issue that doesn’t really get the coverage it should in such a report.

Chapter 8 of Australia in the Asian Century is a very optimistic section of the report however it does hint at the path Australia could follow to being a credible, medium sized economy and influencer in the region. However one has to consider the actions of Australian leaders when asking if the nation is really interested in taking that path.

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Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Three: Australia in Asia

Chapter two of Australia in the Asian Century attempts to predict the development of the region’s economies over the next decade

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

The third Chapter of the Australia in the Asian Century report, “Australia in Asia” attempts to define the role the country currently plays in the region. In some ways this is the most constructive part of the paper in that it describes the lost opportunities of the last 25 years.

Much of the early part of the chapter traces the development of Australia’s engagement with Asia after World War II; Chifley’s post war efforts with the United Nations, Menzies’ engagement with Japan, Whitlam’s going to China, Fraser’s opening to Vietnamese immigration and Hawke’s work on building the APEC agreement are all noted.

Again are the major wars that also formed Australia’s current position in East Asia – World War II, the Malayan Emergency, the Korean and Vietnamese wars – are barely mentioned. This trivialises some of the major influences in today’s complex tapestry of relationships

Of Australia’s closest Asian neighbour, the fall of Sukarno gets a brief nod but Suharto’s removal, the rise of Indonesian democracy and East Timor are all removed from the narrative. There is also no mention of other internal dislocations like the Cultural Revolution or the Indian Partition, all which still have echos today.

In the introduction the Colombo Plan gets a mention and it’s worth reflecting upon its effects.

When I worked in Bangkok in the early 1990s there were a number of business leaders who had been educated in Australia under Colombo Plan scholarships.

That investment by Australia paid dividends through the 1980s and 90s as many of those scholarship students were ardent supporters of Australian businesses and government.

One wonders how today’s students who’ve been treated as milk cows by Australian governments and “seats on bums” to education institutions will feel about the country when they enter business and political leadership positions over the next decade?

The examples of Australian business engagement in Asia are interesting – Blundstone’s is a straight out manufacturing outsourcing story which doesn’t really describe anything not being done by thousands of other businesses while Tangalooma Island Resort is a light of hope in the distressed Australian tourism industry.

A notable omission is how digital media, apps developers and service businesses are faring in Asia. There are many good case studies in those sectors but the writers seem to be, once again, fixated on the trade patterns of the 1980s and 90s rather than success stories in new fields and emerging technologies.

Generally though the description of the Australian economy is again more of the same; a combination of self congratulations on having a government AAA credit rating, hubris over avoiding a GFC induced recession and stating how the services sector has risen to replace the manufacturing that’s been outsourced by companies like Blundstone.

Overall Chapter Three of the Australia in the Asian Century report illustrates the opportunities missed in the last 25 years. Had this report been written twenty years ago it could have forecast a booming relationship in the services and advanced manufacturing sectors. It almost certainly would have included an observation that the days of the Australian economy depending upon minerals exports is over.

What a difference a couple of decades make.

The engagement of Australia with Asia concludes with a look at the changes to the nation’s immigration intakes and demographic composition. This point is, quite rightly, identified as an area of opportunity.

Having Thai restaurants in every suburb and Indian doctors in most country town isn’t really taking advantage of the opportunities presented by having a diverse population and workforce. Chapter Four attempts to look at how these factors, and others, can help Australia’s engagement with the Asian economies.

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Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter One: The rise of Asia

Chapter one of Australia in the Asian Century looks at how the region’s economies developed

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

“Just over two decades ago, the Australian Government commissioned a study of Australia and the Northeast Asian ascendancy” starts the opening of the Australia in the Asian Century report. That sentence describes how this paper is the latest of Australia’s earnest efforts to understand the region.

The opening chapter of the report follows the sensible principle that to plan for the future we have to first understand the present so this section seeks to explain the development of various Asian economies and put those changes into an Australian perspective.

Notable in the narrative is the North East Asian focus, while India gets a brief mention most of the story revolves around the development of China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Chart 1.2, “Asia’s economic dividend” gives the game away when all but one ‘Asian’ country listed is East Asian.

Russia, along with most of South and Central Asia – not to mention other Asia countries like Iran, Turkey and the former Soviet Republics – rate no mention all.

The narratives around the countries which are covered is also deficient – for instance the discussion on Japan’s, South Korea’s and Vietnam’s developments totally ignore post-war reconstruction efforts and their relations with the United States.

China does get a more detailed examination rightly noting it was the country’s admission to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 that really set the economy’s export sector moving, however it skates over the massive dislocations and market reforms introduced in the 1980s which laid the foundations for China’s successful bid to join the WTO.

More notably, the analysis overlooks – probably to avoid upsetting PRC diplomats and making life difficult in Canberra – the role of Taiwanese investment in China and Taiwan’s development itself.

In a similar vein the scant discussion of India misses the role of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the country’s economic development along with the concentration of power in the various industrial conglomerates like the Tata Group.

Again, the same omission is made when discussing the South Korean Chaebols and Japanese Keiretsu. Given the investments made in Australia by all of these industrial conglomerates it’s curious they barely rate a mention in discussing Asia’s industrialisation process.

The discussion on innovation in Chapter 1.3 is useful however it lacks substance in identifying exactly which sectors various Asian economies are specialising in and which industries are in decline as various countries move up the value chain.

Singapore’s success in becoming East Asia’s hub for banking and corporate regional headquarters is a notable omission and again one has a suspicion this is because of ongoing Australian governments’ doomed ambitions to establish Sydney as a regional financial and business centre.

Probably the most glaring omission in Chapter One though is the role of the United States. In tracking the rise of the Indian service sector or Chinese, Japanese and South Korean manufacturing the trade policies of the US cannot be ignored. And yet they largely are.

That failure to acknowledge the US role means report overlooks the Clinton and Bush I Administrations’ forced opening East Asia’s largely closed economies which radically changed South Korea, Taiwan and Japan in the late 1980s and early 90s. Not to mention the critical role the US had during that period in allowing China and Vietnam to join the global trade networks.

Chapter One of Australia in the Asian Century is an unsatisfactory introduction to the complexities of the Asian economies and one suspects is because of the compromises made to assuage the egos and groupthink of Canberra’s mandarins and politicians.

Most importantly, it fails to put the last thirty years’ developments in Asia into an Australian context or perspective. In this respect, it’s a fitting start to a largely inadequate report.

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Gift giving in China

Giving gifts in Asian cultures can be fraught with risks

A terrific little infographic from cross cultural PR firm Illuminant shows the right and wrong ways of giving gifts in China.

The first faux pas listed is giving clocks and the advice “if you happen to receive a clock from any Chinese source, get your butt to airport pronto” is marvellous.

Giving gifts in sets of six or eight is also a great little gem.

One of the cultural differences between East Asia and the west is the habit of giving small gifts of appreciation and it’s easy to get this wrong. What is acceptable in the People’s Republic of China might be a grave mistake in Korea or Thailand.

A handy little app for dealing with cross cultural misunderstandings is Hooked In Motion’s World Customs and Cultures that lets you dial up the basic protocols like not touching heads or hand gestures which should be avoided. Sadly it doesn’t cover gift giving.

Illuminant’s infographic and Hooked In Motion’s app remind us that the whole world isn’t being homogenised by the web and global communications as each culture takes today’s tools and adapts them to their own worlds.

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Enter the Dragon

The development of Aliyun, a mobile phone software package, illustrates how Chinese industry is moving up the value chain.

Once up a time our parents laughed at the tinny little Japanese cars – in the 1960s companies with silly names like Toyota and Mazda could never threaten world giants like Chrysler, Ford and General Motors.

Within two decades the Japanese had moved their products up the value chain leaving their American and European competitors running scared while governments in western countries offered the new leaders of the manufacturing industries bribes to set up plants in their towns and states.

It was always obvious China would follow the same course as the Japanese, particularly given the country’s position as the world’s cheap labor supplier had a time limit thanks to the demographic effects of the 1970s One Child Policy.

So it’s no surprise that Alibaba, China’s biggest e-commerce service, has built its own mobile operating system to compete with Google’s Android.

If Aliyun follows the Japanese development path, the first version is terrible but within five years – the development cycle of software is a lot quicker than that of cars – Alibaba will be a viable competitor to Google and Android.

Chinese developers moving into the mobile market is terrible news for the also rans like Microsoft and Blackberry. As Apple dominate the premium mobile sector and Android the mass market, it’s very hard for those running third or lower to achieve the critical mass needed to be competitive. Aliyun makes it much harder for them to gain any traction in high growth developing markets.

An interesting aspect of the Wall Street Journal’s story is how Aliyun is aimed at the domestic Chinese market for the moment. This is part of China’s economy moving away from being overly reliant on exports, having locally made products that meet the needs and aspirations of a growing domestic economy is an important part of this process.

Exports though will remain an important part of the Chinese economy for most of this century and value added products like Aliyun will be important for China as the cheap labour advantage erodes over the next two decades.

Businesses who think their markets are protected because their quality is better than their Chinese competitors may be in for a nasty shock, just like the 20th Century auto makers who dismissed the Japanese were in the 1970s.

Whether Aliyun is successful or not, we’re once again seeing many of the facile assumptions about Chinese growth being tested as the country’s economy and society evolves.

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Six billion pairs of socks

How shallow beliefs don’t substitute for economic analysis or business sense

Ever since the days of Napoleon business people have lusted over the idea of selling into the Chinese market – the idea of a billion people clambering to buy just one widget each brings a gleam to the eyes of even jaded entrepreneurs.

When Deng Xaioping opened the Chinese economy in the mid 1980s Australian brewers, Swiss watchmakers and German motor manufacturers rushed into the country believing that a billion liberated peasants would rush to buy expensive beer and watches.

As it turned out, the real opportunities for foreigners were in the other direction. When China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001 the boom that had already started in the Special Economic Zones along the southern Chinese coast spread across the Eastern provinces as manufacturing from Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan to find cheaper labour.

300km South-West of Shanghai the city of Datang became “sock town” where local companies manufactured a third of the world’s sock supply.

Chinese sock manufacturers became so competitive that their Japanese counterparts were forced to move upmarket in an effort to secure a position in an industry awash with cheap products.

Today the Chinese sock industry is looking sick as manufacturers go broke and inventories pile up reports The Observer.

Excess capacity is a problem in many industries, particularly motor manufacturing where governments around the world have supported their local producers resulting in a glut of cars and trucks. Socks are no exception to the laws of supply and demand.

The travails of China’s sock industry are a cautionary tale for those who project straight lines for Chinese growth.

Facile assumptions that every man, woman and child on the planet needs to buy two pairs of socks a year, or that China will build millions of steel hungry apartments each year, is not economic analysis and any business built on such shaky beliefs is leaving itself vulnerable when things don’t work out.

The same is true for nations. Hollow assumptions can put an entire economy on shaky ground. Just thinking that every Chinese family needs six pairs of socks doesn’t guarantee economic success.

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Short sharp shocks

China’s changes will catch us by surprise regardless of whether they are good or bad.

In Atlantic Magazine’s China’s long history of defying the doomsayers, Stephen Platt and Jeffrey Wasserstrom put the case that the Chinese Communist Party is unlikely to fall in our lifetimes.

China’s military is presently powerful enough and its diplomacy stable enough that the Communist Party faces no realistic threats from outside. Internally, its control over society is effective enough that, while unrest and discontent may be widespread, there are neither well-organized opposition parties nor rebellious armies that might seriously challenge the central government.

They are probably right, it’s difficult to see any immediate threat to the power of China’s current leaders.

Although we should keep in mind that only a few decades ago it was inconceivable that the Soviet Union would disintegrate or the Warsaw Pact dissolve.

Had someone wrote in 1986 that within five years both would happen, they would have been written off as being foolish. But that’s what happened.

In the stock market it’s said “the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent” and it’s true for any pundit – you may be right that property is overvalued, the US is in decline or the Eurozone will break up, but the powers that be will may be able to kick the can down the road and sustain the unsustainable for a lot longer than any of us expect.

Steve Keen found this with the ‘walking to Kosciusko” bet where he was railroaded into giving a fixed date of when the Australian property market would fall. He, nor anyone he made the wager with, had any idea of the billions of dollars governments would throw at the market to maintain prices.

All too often people make the right calls about property markets, economies or the fall of regimes but get their timing wrong.

In his book The Sun Always Rises Ernest Hemmingway’s character Mike Campbell describes how he went bankrupt – “Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”

And so it is with empires, nations, ideologies and even the most powerful corporation. When the change happens it’s sudden and unexpected.

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