Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter One: The rise of Asia

Chapter one of Australia in the Asian Century looks at how the region’s economies developed

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

“Just over two decades ago, the Australian Government commissioned a study of Australia and the Northeast Asian ascendancy” starts the opening of the Australia in the Asian Century report. That sentence describes how this paper is the latest of Australia’s earnest efforts to understand the region.

The opening chapter of the report follows the sensible principle that to plan for the future we have to first understand the present so this section seeks to explain the development of various Asian economies and put those changes into an Australian perspective.

Notable in the narrative is the North East Asian focus, while India gets a brief mention most of the story revolves around the development of China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Chart 1.2, “Asia’s economic dividend” gives the game away when all but one ‘Asian’ country listed is East Asian.

Russia, along with most of South and Central Asia – not to mention other Asia countries like Iran, Turkey and the former Soviet Republics – rate no mention all.

The narratives around the countries which are covered is also deficient – for instance the discussion on Japan’s, South Korea’s and Vietnam’s developments totally ignore post-war reconstruction efforts and their relations with the United States.

China does get a more detailed examination rightly noting it was the country’s admission to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 that really set the economy’s export sector moving, however it skates over the massive dislocations and market reforms introduced in the 1980s which laid the foundations for China’s successful bid to join the WTO.

More notably, the analysis overlooks – probably to avoid upsetting PRC diplomats and making life difficult in Canberra – the role of Taiwanese investment in China and Taiwan’s development itself.

In a similar vein the scant discussion of India misses the role of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the country’s economic development along with the concentration of power in the various industrial conglomerates like the Tata Group.

Again, the same omission is made when discussing the South Korean Chaebols and Japanese Keiretsu. Given the investments made in Australia by all of these industrial conglomerates it’s curious they barely rate a mention in discussing Asia’s industrialisation process.

The discussion on innovation in Chapter 1.3 is useful however it lacks substance in identifying exactly which sectors various Asian economies are specialising in and which industries are in decline as various countries move up the value chain.

Singapore’s success in becoming East Asia’s hub for banking and corporate regional headquarters is a notable omission and again one has a suspicion this is because of ongoing Australian governments’ doomed ambitions to establish Sydney as a regional financial and business centre.

Probably the most glaring omission in Chapter One though is the role of the United States. In tracking the rise of the Indian service sector or Chinese, Japanese and South Korean manufacturing the trade policies of the US cannot be ignored. And yet they largely are.

That failure to acknowledge the US role means report overlooks the Clinton and Bush I Administrations’ forced opening East Asia’s largely closed economies which radically changed South Korea, Taiwan and Japan in the late 1980s and early 90s. Not to mention the critical role the US had during that period in allowing China and Vietnam to join the global trade networks.

Chapter One of Australia in the Asian Century is an unsatisfactory introduction to the complexities of the Asian economies and one suspects is because of the compromises made to assuage the egos and groupthink of Canberra’s mandarins and politicians.

Most importantly, it fails to put the last thirty years’ developments in Asia into an Australian context or perspective. In this respect, it’s a fitting start to a largely inadequate report.

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Gift giving in China

Giving gifts in Asian cultures can be fraught with risks

A terrific little infographic from cross cultural PR firm Illuminant shows the right and wrong ways of giving gifts in China.

The first faux pas listed is giving clocks and the advice “if you happen to receive a clock from any Chinese source, get your butt to airport pronto” is marvellous.

Giving gifts in sets of six or eight is also a great little gem.

One of the cultural differences between East Asia and the west is the habit of giving small gifts of appreciation and it’s easy to get this wrong. What is acceptable in the People’s Republic of China might be a grave mistake in Korea or Thailand.

A handy little app for dealing with cross cultural misunderstandings is Hooked In Motion’s World Customs and Cultures that lets you dial up the basic protocols like not touching heads or hand gestures which should be avoided. Sadly it doesn’t cover gift giving.

Illuminant’s infographic and Hooked In Motion’s app remind us that the whole world isn’t being homogenised by the web and global communications as each culture takes today’s tools and adapts them to their own worlds.

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Is Australia’s blue sky future making way for a red sunset?

Australia’s political and business leaders are not prepared for Chinese risks to the nation’s economy

Australia’s political and business leaders are convinced the nation will ride on the back of a fast growing China for the foreseeable future.

Having climbed off the sheep’s back during the 1980s and moved from being an economy dependent on agricultural exports to a ‘clever country’ exporting high value services and products, in the late 1990s Australia turned its back on building a modern economy and decided to stake the future on a never ending coal and iron ore boom driven by Chinese industrialisation.

Smarter than Bill Gates

Australia’s success in riding China’s coattails allowed the Reserve Bank Governor Glenn Stevens in 2010 to boast how he and the nation’s politicians were smarter than Bill Gates who nine years earlier warned Australia about being over reliant on commodities.

Despite the hubris, there are real risks in the Chinese economy that the blue sky mining school of Australian economic management needs to plan for.

China warnings

The warning to US Presidential candidates on trade with China by Professor Patrick Chovanec of Beijing’s Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management is a good starting point.

In his warning Professor Chovanec points out that Chinese growth in recent years has been driven by the construction sector, even if building activity were to stay constant this would shave off half of China’s growth rate. The options for stimulating the economy in manner similar to 2008 have narrowed.

China’s economy is not just slowing, it is entering a serious correction.  The investment bubble that has been driving Chinese growth has popped, and there are no quick “stimulus” fixes left.  There is the very real possibility of some form of financial crisis in China before year’s end.

China’s stimulus package was the world’s biggest response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, followed by the South Koreans (another Australian commodities customers) and Australia itself.

While the Chinese commodities boom drove most of Australia’s trade, it was domestic spending driven by the Rudd government’s stimulus package that saved Australia from entering recession.

Squandering a century’s boom

One of the notable things about Australia’s commodity success in the 2000s is just how little a dent the booming coal and iron ore exports put in the trade deficit. Despite record terms of trade, Australians still manage to spend as much on imports as they make on exported goods.

Not that this worries Australia’s leaders who seem to spend all of their time worrying about pandering to a tiny number of marginal seat voters who listen to fear mongering talkback radio hosts which is what has driven the last two weeks’ obsession with a few hundred asylum seekers.

Professor Chovanec points out the Chinese leadership is distracted as well with their struggles over a messy change of Politburo leadership, risking that the policy makers might miss any opportunity they have to engineer a ‘soft’ landing for their economy.

The biggest risk is that of a crisis engineered to distract a discontented population warns Chovanec;

in a worst case scenario, China may be tempted to provoke a conflict in the South China Sea to redirect popular discontent onto an external enemy.

Already such things are happening, as anti-Japanese demonstrations step up around China over an island dispute.

There are no shortage of island disputes in the South China Sea and almost all scenarios involve allies of the United States – the only one feasible dispute that doesn’t is Vietnam and China’s leadership has had their nose blooded in such disputes with their southern neighbour before.

Even if we don’t see military tensions between the US and China, we certainly are going to see trade and political disputes in the next few years as both countries adapt to their places in a changed world.

For Australia’s business and political leaders, it means being prepared for a world more complex than one where a country can get by just lazily skimming a few dollars of easy iron ore exports to China.

We have to hope Australia’s leaders are capable of dealing with the challenges of a much more dynamic and difficult world where huge growth of one friendly trading partner is not assured. The stakes are too high to be distracted by suburban apparatchiks scoring meaningless political points off each other.

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