Tag: trade

Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Seven: Connecting to Asian Markets

How can Australia improve its business, trade and government links with Asian countries?

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report.

The seventh chapter of Australia in the Asian Century looks at how the country’s businesses and governments can engage with markets in Asia. In some ways this is the most effective chapter of the report.

At the beginning of the chapter introduction points out that Asia offers bigger markets than Australia and says “Australian businesses need to build on their existing advantages by developing new capabilities and approaches as they become fully part of the region.”

This is true, but the Chapter never really identifies what Australia business’ existing advantages really are and again this is a weakness in the report.

National objective 17. Australia’s businesses will be recognised globally for their excellence and ability to operate successfully in Asian markets.

How this comes about is difficult to say, and what governments can actually do to help businesses be recognised globally isn’t really identified.

The CPA case study is notable for illustrating the number of Australian expats working in Asia. In many ways these people are the wasted talents that should have been cultivated by domestic businesses through the 1990s and 2000s.

Saying that businesses need to be part of the global supply chain is a statement of the obvious and Chapter 7.3 does discuss the importance of efficient ports, fast customs procedures and reduced barriers to trade. This ties into National Objective 18a.

National objective 18a.The Australian economy will be more open and integrated with Asia, through efforts to improve our domestic arrangements. The flow of goods, services, capital, ideas and people will be easier.

  • Australia’s trade links with Asia will be at least one-third of GDP by 2025, up from one-quarter in 2011.

It’s difficult to argue with this objective, although one wonders what Canberra has been doing for the last twenty years on smoothing the flow of goods, services, capital and ideas. Hopefully this is one of the relatively easy areas where a Gillard, or Abbott, government can deliver.

National objective 18b. The Australian economy will be more open and integrated with Asia, through comprehensive regional agreements, better aligned economic regulations, greater infrastructure connectivity and enhanced understanding of each country’s arrangements. The flow of goods, services, capital, ideas and people will be easier and Australian businesses and investors will have greater access to opportunities in Asia.

This objective focuses around formal trade links and really only describes the current policy – continued from the Howard government – of signing bilateral trade agreements rather than waiting for the cumbersome and possibly never ending global negotiations to actually deliver something.

Most of Chapter Seven is focused on describing the various trade initiatives the Australian government is engaged in through APEC, ASEAN and various other forums.

All of these are good initiatives and these are the brightest spot in the entire report, this is where the Australian political system has delivered bipartisan support for a long term plan and it’s a shame we can’t see more actions similar to this in areas like education, taxes and sustainability.

Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter Two: The future of Asia

Chapter two of Australia in the Asian Century attempts to predict the development of the region’s economies over the next decade

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

“Asia’s economic resurgence is set to continue” is the bold statement at the beginning of Chapter Two of the Australia in the Asian Century report and with that the chapter immediately falls back to warm motherhood statements;

Average living standards are set to improve dramatically and transform the way people live and work. Asia’s economies are projected to expand at a strong rate. The region’s expansion and development will change the contours of Asia and the globe—opening up exciting new opportunities, while also posing some challenges.

All of this is true, however the report struggles to identify exactly what those challenges and opportunities are as Asia develops and where Australians fit into the region’s evolving economy.

Demographics will matter, but they are not destiny

The constant mantra through the report is “demographics will matter, but they are not destiny.” Yet, despite the headline, Chapter Two illustrates that so far it has been destiny.

Graph 2.6 of the report shows how Japan’s, and now South Korea’s, productivity has tailed off as the population has aged. This is to be expected when economic expansion has been based on labour intensive manufacturing, as China’s is today.

Frustratingly, the report acknowledges this with the following paragraph;

But the fruits of adopting new technology and adapting it will become harder to harvest. A point will come, though it’s still some way off, where the growth of labour productivity in developing Asian economies will slow—opportunities for gains from importing foreign technology and for shifting workers from agriculture to industry will diminish.

“Some point in the future” doesn’t wash when the rest of the chapter shows off various ‘firm’ numbers estimating ‘base’, ‘low’ and ‘high’ growth rates. If you can quantify those growth assumptions, then it should be fairly trivial to estimate the turning point where aging populations start to affect China.

Luckily others have done this work, the Australian Macrobusiness site suggests that turning point could be as early as 2015. In which case, unlike Japan and South Korea, China will have got old before it got rich.

If this true, then IMF’s projected growth rates will miss their targets – particularly the ‘low growth’ scenario which is almost identical to their ‘base scenario’.

Rise of the middle class

Much of the emphasis in this view of Asia’s development is on the rise of the middle class and the report features a case study of Hitesh, a middle class stockbroker in Ahmedabad.

While there’s no doubt Hitesh and his family’s income and standard of living are rising, the idea that several hundred million Indian and Chinese will jump to European or North American income levels before 2025 is improbable.

Most stockbrokers in New York, London or Sydney earn between 30 and 300 times Hitesh’s $5,000 a year and in 2010, average Chinese income was a tenth of the US.

Even if the Indian and Chinese middle classes did manage a tenfold growth in income over the next decade, the assumption they would adopt the debt driven high consumption patterns of the US or Australia isn’t a given as we see in how the Japanese middle classes haven’t aped the spending behaviour of their profligate Western friends.

The credit and banking points in this chapter illustrate the hubris mentioned in my original overview of Australia in the Asian Century.

And with financial systems in advanced economies unwinding the high debt levels built up before the Global Financial Crisis, financial institutions in stronger economic positions, such as those in Australia and elsewhere in the Asian region, will have opportunities to expand into new markets.

Given the dire records of Australian banks in expanding overseas along with the “stronger economic position” being due more to government guarantees during the GFC and the desperate political desire to prop up Australia’s property market at all costs, it’s difficult to see exactly what Australian institutions have to offer Asian savers except to further underwrite the never ending down under housing bubble.

Chapter two of the Australia in the Asian Century report finishes with an overview of the current geopolitical situation which is notable more for what has been left out. This is again probably due to Canberra public service politics and the report suffers for it.

One major region left out is Central Asia and Russia – outstanding given the report’s view  that a resource poor Asia (that Japanese assumption again) will need Australia to fuel its energy and resources needs – which ignores the construction of pipelines and railways to China and India.

Also missed are the projects to upgrade China’s railway and road links to Europe and Central Asia. These in themselves may trigger major geopolitical changes over the next few years, as we’re seeing today in Tibet and Xinjiang after railways were built to Kashgar to Lhasa. Yet none of this is considered.

Not the ‘Stans should feel aggrieved, like the rest of the report the emphasis is on China and India with scant mention of other Asian countries.

For Australia, much of the hope in the report seems to be in providing raw materials for Asia’s industrialising and urbanising societies along with being a holiday destination and education provider. This is all lazy 1980s thinking which projects Australia’s Japanese experience of thirty years ago onto China and India today.

The predictions of Asia’s future in the Australia in the Asian Century report are largely are a continuation of the status quo. If this report had been written in 1960, it may have picked the rise of Japan over the following twenty years but the main focus would have been on Burma as Asia’s richest independent country.

Exacerbating the report’s weakness are the assumptions that development paths will follow the same course as Japan, Taiwan or South Korea in the late 20th Century.

Development wasn’t a smooth path in all three of those countries and each had their own unique political and economic upheavals in that time, the failure to recognise that similar disruptions will happen in Asia’s emerging economies as they develop is probably the greatest weakness in the entire report.

It’s very easy to draw straight lines on graphs based on ‘best case’ IMF projections but history is rarely linear. This is probably the greatest intellectual failing of the white paper.

Australia in the Asian Century – Chapter One: The rise of Asia

Chapter one of Australia in the Asian Century looks at how the region’s economies developed

This post is one of the series of articles on the Australia in the Asian Century report. An initial overview of the report is at Australian Hubris in the Asian Century.

“Just over two decades ago, the Australian Government commissioned a study of Australia and the Northeast Asian ascendancy” starts the opening of the Australia in the Asian Century report. That sentence describes how this paper is the latest of Australia’s earnest efforts to understand the region.

The opening chapter of the report follows the sensible principle that to plan for the future we have to first understand the present so this section seeks to explain the development of various Asian economies and put those changes into an Australian perspective.

Notable in the narrative is the North East Asian focus, while India gets a brief mention most of the story revolves around the development of China, Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea. Chart 1.2, “Asia’s economic dividend” gives the game away when all but one ‘Asian’ country listed is East Asian.

Russia, along with most of South and Central Asia – not to mention other Asia countries like Iran, Turkey and the former Soviet Republics – rate no mention all.

The narratives around the countries which are covered is also deficient – for instance the discussion on Japan’s, South Korea’s and Vietnam’s developments totally ignore post-war reconstruction efforts and their relations with the United States.

China does get a more detailed examination rightly noting it was the country’s admission to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 that really set the economy’s export sector moving, however it skates over the massive dislocations and market reforms introduced in the 1980s which laid the foundations for China’s successful bid to join the WTO.

More notably, the analysis overlooks – probably to avoid upsetting PRC diplomats and making life difficult in Canberra – the role of Taiwanese investment in China and Taiwan’s development itself.

In a similar vein the scant discussion of India misses the role of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in the country’s economic development along with the concentration of power in the various industrial conglomerates like the Tata Group.

Again, the same omission is made when discussing the South Korean Chaebols and Japanese Keiretsu. Given the investments made in Australia by all of these industrial conglomerates it’s curious they barely rate a mention in discussing Asia’s industrialisation process.

The discussion on innovation in Chapter 1.3 is useful however it lacks substance in identifying exactly which sectors various Asian economies are specialising in and which industries are in decline as various countries move up the value chain.

Singapore’s success in becoming East Asia’s hub for banking and corporate regional headquarters is a notable omission and again one has a suspicion this is because of ongoing Australian governments’ doomed ambitions to establish Sydney as a regional financial and business centre.

Probably the most glaring omission in Chapter One though is the role of the United States. In tracking the rise of the Indian service sector or Chinese, Japanese and South Korean manufacturing the trade policies of the US cannot be ignored. And yet they largely are.

That failure to acknowledge the US role means report overlooks the Clinton and Bush I Administrations’ forced opening East Asia’s largely closed economies which radically changed South Korea, Taiwan and Japan in the late 1980s and early 90s. Not to mention the critical role the US had during that period in allowing China and Vietnam to join the global trade networks.

Chapter One of Australia in the Asian Century is an unsatisfactory introduction to the complexities of the Asian economies and one suspects is because of the compromises made to assuage the egos and groupthink of Canberra’s mandarins and politicians.

Most importantly, it fails to put the last thirty years’ developments in Asia into an Australian context or perspective. In this respect, it’s a fitting start to a largely inadequate report.

Gift giving in China

Giving gifts in Asian cultures can be fraught with risks

A terrific little infographic from cross cultural PR firm Illuminant shows the right and wrong ways of giving gifts in China.

The first faux pas listed is giving clocks and the advice “if you happen to receive a clock from any Chinese source, get your butt to airport pronto” is marvellous.

Giving gifts in sets of six or eight is also a great little gem.

One of the cultural differences between East Asia and the west is the habit of giving small gifts of appreciation and it’s easy to get this wrong. What is acceptable in the People’s Republic of China might be a grave mistake in Korea or Thailand.

A handy little app for dealing with cross cultural misunderstandings is Hooked In Motion’s World Customs and Cultures that lets you dial up the basic protocols like not touching heads or hand gestures which should be avoided. Sadly it doesn’t cover gift giving.

Illuminant’s infographic and Hooked In Motion’s app remind us that the whole world isn’t being homogenised by the web and global communications as each culture takes today’s tools and adapts them to their own worlds.

Is Australia’s blue sky future making way for a red sunset?

Australia’s political and business leaders are not prepared for Chinese risks to the nation’s economy

Australia’s political and business leaders are convinced the nation will ride on the back of a fast growing China for the foreseeable future.

Having climbed off the sheep’s back during the 1980s and moved from being an economy dependent on agricultural exports to a ‘clever country’ exporting high value services and products, in the late 1990s Australia turned its back on building a modern economy and decided to stake the future on a never ending coal and iron ore boom driven by Chinese industrialisation.

Smarter than Bill Gates

Australia’s success in riding China’s coattails allowed the Reserve Bank Governor Glenn Stevens in 2010 to boast how he and the nation’s politicians were smarter than Bill Gates who nine years earlier warned Australia about being over reliant on commodities.

Despite the hubris, there are real risks in the Chinese economy that the blue sky mining school of Australian economic management needs to plan for.

China warnings

The warning to US Presidential candidates on trade with China by Professor Patrick Chovanec of Beijing’s Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management is a good starting point.

In his warning Professor Chovanec points out that Chinese growth in recent years has been driven by the construction sector, even if building activity were to stay constant this would shave off half of China’s growth rate. The options for stimulating the economy in manner similar to 2008 have narrowed.

China’s economy is not just slowing, it is entering a serious correction.  The investment bubble that has been driving Chinese growth has popped, and there are no quick “stimulus” fixes left.  There is the very real possibility of some form of financial crisis in China before year’s end.

China’s stimulus package was the world’s biggest response to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, followed by the South Koreans (another Australian commodities customers) and Australia itself.

While the Chinese commodities boom drove most of Australia’s trade, it was domestic spending driven by the Rudd government’s stimulus package that saved Australia from entering recession.

Squandering a century’s boom

One of the notable things about Australia’s commodity success in the 2000s is just how little a dent the booming coal and iron ore exports put in the trade deficit. Despite record terms of trade, Australians still manage to spend as much on imports as they make on exported goods.

Not that this worries Australia’s leaders who seem to spend all of their time worrying about pandering to a tiny number of marginal seat voters who listen to fear mongering talkback radio hosts which is what has driven the last two weeks’ obsession with a few hundred asylum seekers.

Professor Chovanec points out the Chinese leadership is distracted as well with their struggles over a messy change of Politburo leadership, risking that the policy makers might miss any opportunity they have to engineer a ‘soft’ landing for their economy.

The biggest risk is that of a crisis engineered to distract a discontented population warns Chovanec;

in a worst case scenario, China may be tempted to provoke a conflict in the South China Sea to redirect popular discontent onto an external enemy.

Already such things are happening, as anti-Japanese demonstrations step up around China over an island dispute.

There are no shortage of island disputes in the South China Sea and almost all scenarios involve allies of the United States – the only one feasible dispute that doesn’t is Vietnam and China’s leadership has had their nose blooded in such disputes with their southern neighbour before.

Even if we don’t see military tensions between the US and China, we certainly are going to see trade and political disputes in the next few years as both countries adapt to their places in a changed world.

For Australia’s business and political leaders, it means being prepared for a world more complex than one where a country can get by just lazily skimming a few dollars of easy iron ore exports to China.

We have to hope Australia’s leaders are capable of dealing with the challenges of a much more dynamic and difficult world where huge growth of one friendly trading partner is not assured. The stakes are too high to be distracted by suburban apparatchiks scoring meaningless political points off each other.